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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
801(8)(1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellee agrees with the Statement of the Issues and Standard 
of Review provided in the Appellant's brief. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 24: 
"All Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
14th Amendment, United States Constitution: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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Section 34A-2-413(5), Utah Code Annotated (1997): 
Not withstanding the minimum rate established in 
Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the 
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employer's 
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received 
compensation from the employer or the employer's 
insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall 
be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the 
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security 
retirement benefits received by the employee during 
the same period. (Emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mr. Merrill filed an Application for Hearing on February 21, 2003 
seeking payment of permanent total disability compensation from his 
employer, Vermax of Florida, Inc., related to industrial accidents on 
May 14, 1998 and April 13, 2001. (R. at 1-7). Wausau provided 
workers' compensation coverage to the employer on May 14, 1998, 
and the Workers' Compensation Fund provided coverage for the April 
13, 2001 accident. (R. at 12-17). 
The Administrative Law Judge held an evidentiary hearing on 
November 13, 2004. (R. at 35). On April 29, 2004, the 
Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
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Law and Order finding Mr. Merrill permanently and totally disabled on 
August 28, 2001 as a result of his May 14, 1998 accident. (R. at 19-
34). The Administrative Law Judge afforded Wausau 10 days from 
the date of that Order to advise the commission whether it wished to 
file a re-employment plan. (R. 33). 
3. Wausau appealed the Order, challenging the Administrative Law 
Judge's conclusion that the May 14, 1998 accident was the direct 
cause of Mr. Merrill's subsequent permanent total disability. 
Wausau also objected to the short, 10 day period afforded by the 
Administrative Law Judge, for Wausau to decide whether to submit a 
re-employment plan. (R. at 41-55). 
4. The Labor Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision regarding the cause of Mr. Merrill's permanent total 
disability, but afforded Wausau an opportunity to submit a re-
employment plan under Section 34A-2-413(6) on remand to the 
Administrative Law Judge. (R. at 65-69). 
5. The ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
March 24, 2005 awarding permanent total disability compensation. 
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The Order failed to consider the offset provisions contained in 
Section 34A-2-413(5). (R. at 78-83). 
6. Wausau filed a Motion for Review on April 7, 2005, requesting the 
commission address the statutory offsets provided in Sections 34A-
2-413(4) and 34A-2-413(5). (R. 84-87). 
7. The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission issued an Order of 
Remand on February 1, 2006, returning this matter to the 
Administrative Law Judge to address the appropriateness of the 
statutory offsets. (R. 105-107). The Administrative Law Judge 
scheduled briefing deadlines and a hearing on April 16, 2006, to 
receive oral argument regarding Wausau's request for language 
clarifying their entitlement to the statutory offsets. (R. at 109-110) 
8. The Administrative Law Judge issued a Supplemental Order on 
Remand on May 17, 2006. (R. at 131-137). 
9. Mr. Merrill filed a Motion for Review on June 7, 2006 alleging that the 
offset of one-half of the Social Security Retirement benefits provided 
by Section 34A-2-413(5) is unconstitutional. (R. at 138-142). 
10. The Utah Labor Commission issued an Order Denying the Motion for 
Review on June 29, 2006. (R. at 154-156). 
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11. Mr. Merrill filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals 
on July 28, 2006. 
FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute in this matter. 
1. Mr. Merrill sustained a low back injury at work on May 14, 1998 while 
working for Vermax of Florida, Inc. 
2. Vermax of Florida, Inc. was insured by Wausau Business Insurance 
on May 14, 1998. 
3. Wausau paid medical expenses as well as compensation for a 7% 
whole man permanent impairment rating, or 21.84 weeks at $310 per 
week, for a total of $6,770.40 in permanent partial disability 
compensation, related to the May 14, 1998 accident. 
4. Mr. Merrill missed no time from work as a result of the May 14, 1998 
accident. 
5. He suffered another industrial injury, found by the commission to 
have caused a temporary aggravation of his underlying back 
condition, on April 13, 2001. On April 13, 2001, Vermax of Florida, 
Inc. was insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund. 
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6. Mr. Merrill continued to work following the April 13, 2001 accident, 
until August 28, 2001, when he discontinued working. 
7. The Labor Commission awarded Mr. Merrill permanent total disability 
compensation at the rate of $395 per week, beginning on August 28, 
2001. Mr. Merrill's permanent total disability was found to be the 
result of the May 14, 1998 accident. 
8. Mr. Merrill's date of birth is December 29, 1937. Based upon his 
date of birth, he reached "full retirement age" for Social Security 
Retirement benefits, at age 65. Mr. Merrill is currently receiving 
Social Security Retirement benefits. 
9. Pursuant to Section 34A-2-413(5), after Mr. Merrill has received six 
years of permanent total disability compensation benefits, his 
benefits "shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the 
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits 
received" by him during the same period. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The "reverse offset" provision of § 34A-2-413(5) clearly and 
unambiguously mandates that permanent total disability compensation 
must be reduced by one-half of the injured worker's Social Security 
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retirement benefit. This "reverse offset" is rationally related to legitimate 
state interests of avoiding double payment of wage loss benefits by the 
employer and controlling the cost of workers' compensation insurance. 
The Utah Legislature carefully crafted this "reverse offset" to allow the 
injured worker to keep the portion of the Social Security retirement benefit 
for which he paid premiums through payroll taxes. Conversely, the offset 
relieves the employer from paying twice, one half of the Social Security 
retirement benefit and full workers' compensation benefits, for the same 
loss of earning capacity. Because the statutory "reverse offset" is 
rationally related to legitimate state purposes, the statute does not violate 
the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause or the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
Workers' compensation is a system of statutorily created benefits 
designed to protect injured workers and employers from the uncertainty of 
pursuing a personal injury negligence action for injuries that occur at work. 
This system provides the injured worker certain benefits under a "no fault" 
system so long as the injury is causally related to the employment. The 
employer receives the benefit of more predictable benefits and the 
protection of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation 
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Act. See generally, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, § 1.03 
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2006). Most workers' compensation claims are 
accepted and paid without dispute by the employer or its insurance carrier. 
Wage replacement benefits and medical expenses are paid pursuant to the 
statute and the injured worker is returned to work. When there are 
disputes between the parties related to the compensability or extent of the 
injury, the injured worker's claim is adjudicated before the Labor 
Commission. The workers' compensation system is designed to benefit 
both the injured worker and the employer. id-
Mr. Merrill argues that the offset provision contained in § 34A-2-
413(5) is unconstitutional because it will reduce his workers' compensation 
permanent total disability benefits after the first 312 weeks, or 6 years, of 
benefits have been paid. Mr. Merrill argues that the statutory offset of 
workers' compensation benefits against his Social Security retirement 
benefits subjects him to unlawful discrimination based on his age under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. For the 
reasons outlined below, Wausau submits that the "reverse offset" provision 
of the Workers' Compensation Act is constitutional. 
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Age is not considered a suspect class subject to strict scrutiny under 
the federal Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia. 427 U.S. 
307, 313-314 (1976). In this regard, the Murgia Court observed, that "older 
persons, again, unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis of race 
or gender, have not been subjected to a 'history of purposeful unequal 
treatment.'" Murgia, at 313. "Old age also does not define a discrete and 
insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, 
will experience it." Murgia at 313-314. "States may discriminate on the 
basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age 
classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 
The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not 
require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they 
serve with razorlike precision. Rather, a state may rely on age as a proxy 
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the 
State's legitimate interests. That age proves to be an inadequate proxy in 
any individual case is irrelevant" Kimel et al. v. Florida Bd. of Regents, et 
aL, 528 U.S.62, 83 (2000). Therefore, Mr. Merrill's claim of statutory 
discrimination based on his age is reviewed under the "rational basis" 
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standard. Mr. Merrill's equal protection argument under the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot succeed unless he can show this Court that the 
"reverse offset" provision of § 34A-2-413(5) is not rationally related to a 
legitimate state purpose. 
The Utah Court of Appeals previously reviewed the constitutionality 
of a Social Security offset provision similar to that of § 34A-2-413(5) in the 
context of an offset of unemployment benefits against Social Security 
retirement benefits. Harrington v. Labor Commission. 942 P.2d 961 (Ut. 
App. 1997). In Harrington, the Court concluded that the statutory language 
requiring the offset was clear and unambiguous and was rationally related 
to legitimate state interests. Id. at 965-966. The Harrington Court 
explained: 
Harrington also asserts that Utah's interpretation of the federal 
statute violates his equal protection rights under the United 
States Constitution. In addressing a similar argument, the 
Edwards court held that Colorado's interpretation of section 
3304(a)(15)(A)(l) as requiring application of the offset to all 
Social Security recipients did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution because there were 
"plausible reasons for selecting social security recipients." 
(Citation omitted). First, Social Security "duplicates 
unemployment insurance as a public wage replacement 
program." (Citation omitted). Second, "the blanket application 
of the offset to all social security recipients also may be justified 
on the basis of ease of administration." (Citations omitted). 
Likewise, we find no merit in Harrington's constitutional 
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challenge to the Utah Legislature's application of [the statute] 
for the foregoing reasons and because the state has an interest 
in maintaining the financial integrity of its unemployment 
compensation program. (Citations omitted). We further note 
that although Harrington characterizes the Legislature's 
application of [the statute] as harsh, the judiciary is not 
"licensed to attempt to soften the clear import of Congress' 
chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a 
harsh result." (Citations omitted). 
Harrington at 16. 
The legitimate state purposes articulated to support the offset in 
Harrington likewise support the offset provided in the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. Permanent total disability compensation and Social 
Security retirement benefits both provide income to replace wages that the 
injured worker is no longer able to earn. The legislature determined to 
reduce workers' compensation benefits to avoid duplication of benefits 
upon the injured worker reaching "retirement age." The legislature adopted 
the "retirement age" at which an injured worker qualified for workers' 
compensation benefits. Clearly, the state has a legitimate interest in 
controlling the cost of workers' compensation insurance as well as 
maintaining the financial integrity of Utah's Workers' Compensation 
system. While it is unfortunate that the policy set forth in § 34A-2-413(5) 
adversely affects Mr. Merrill's benefits, the distinction was made for a 
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legitimate state purpose and need not be perfect to survive constitutional 
scrutiny. Disability benefits awarded under workers' compensation are 
intended to compensate an injured worker for loss of earning capacity: 
The typical American compensation act relates the award to 
the disability or loss of earning capacity, in many injuries fixing 
arbitrary periods of disability for loss of particular members; 
and, within the maximum and minimum limits, the amount of 
the award will be a percentage of and therefore vary according 
to previous weekly wages. This reference to previous wage 
level is the significant point of distinction between the American 
system and true social insurance, and shows that it is not an 
outright relief plan, since, within limits, it relates the amount of 
recovery to the amount of wage loss, makes no inquiry into 
actual need by any sort of means test, and, with a few statutory 
exceptions, makes no allowance even for presumed degree of 
need because of number of dependents. 
LARSON'S supra §1.04(3). 
"The purpose of the federal old age benefits of the Social Security 
Act is to provide funds through contributions by employer and employee for 
the decent support of elderly workmen who have ceased to labor." Social 
Security Board v. Nierotko. 327 U.S. 358, 364 (1946). In addition to factors 
related to impairment, education, transferable skills, and causation, § 34A-
2-413(1) requires evaluation of the effect of the injured worker's age on his 
ability to work. Thus, both types of wage replacement benefits are similarly 
intended to provide some financial support for one who is unable to work. 
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The offset in §34A-2-413(5) considers that the employer and 
employee each contribute one-half of the premium to the Social Security 
Administration to fund the payment of retirement benefits to protect 
workers from the loss of earning capacity incurred due to advanced age. 
For this reason, the Utah Legislature provided an offset against 50% of the 
Social Security retirement benefit. 
Professor Larson notes that: 
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia apply some kind 
of deduction to compensation benefits for Social Security 
benefits. . . It may seem odd, with the intense concern about 
compensation costs, that the states have been so slow to 
exploit this obvious way to reduce their compensation burden. 
Although the federal offset in its present form was enacted in 
1965, thus ensuring that there would be a ceiling on the 
combined benefits and that the federal Social Security program 
would reap all the benefit from the elimination of overlap, by 
1975-10 years later- only three states had countered with 
offset provisions of their own: Colorado, Montana, and 
Minnesota. Then, rather rapidly, the number grew to about 16, 
but with more than two-thirds of the states still foregoing this 
cost cutting opportunity. 
LARSON'S supra §157.03(5)(a). 
Professor Larson further observes: 
It is interesting to note that in eight of the offset provisions, the 
reduction applies only to one half of the federal benefit. This 
has obviously been done in response to the familiar argument, 
repeatedly heard in the debates on the Social Security Reform 
Act offset provision, that, since the employee has contributed 
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half of the 'premium' for the employee's Social Security 
coverage, it is unfair to deduct anything from an insurance 
benefit paid for by his or her own contribution. 
LARSON'S supra §157.03(5)(e). 
The offset provision contained in Section 34A-2-413(5) is designed to 
avoid duplicate payment of wage loss benefits by the employer and control 
the cost of workers' compensation insurance for Utah employers without 
creating an unduly harsh result on the injured worker. The offset is clearly 
and unambiguously set forth in the statute and is part of the legislature's 
comprehensive plan to provide benefits for loss of earning capacity to Utah 
injured workers without unfairly burdening Utah employers with double 
payments intended to serve similar purposes. 
The Utah legislature balanced the conflicting interests of injured 
workers and employers when it created the offset in § 34A-2-413(5). This 
partial offset protects the employee from an unreasonably harsh reduction 
in benefits and protects the employer from double payment of wage loss 
benefits. It also helps to limit the cost of workers' compensation insurance. 
The "reverse offset" contained in § 34A-2-413(5) balances the competing 
interests of employers and employees and helps to keep Utah's workers' 
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compensation system viable. This "reverse offset" prevents the employer 
from paying twice for the same loss of earning capacity. 
Mr. Merrill asserts that reducing costs for employers is not a 
legitimate purpose for creating the offset at issue here. But Mr. Merrill fails 
to recognize that every citizen of this State benefits from a no fault system 
of workers' compensation that is affordable and sustainable, yet allows the 
employee to retain the full measure of Social Security retirement benefits 
for which he paid. Clearly, these reasons are sufficient to show legitimate 
bases for the offset provided in § 34A-2-413(5). 
CONCLUSION 
The Social Security Retirement benefit offset in Utah's permanent 
total disability statute, Section 34A-2-413(5) is constitutional. The Utah 
legislature carefully crafted this offset to balance the interests of the 
employee and employer, and to control the cost of Utah' s workers' 
compensation insurance to keep the system viable and its insurers, solvent 
while still affording injured workers lifetime compensation for loss of 
earning capacity. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of U££J2AVW^ 2006. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Sharon J. Eble/ 
Attorney for Appellees Vermax of 
Florida, Inc. dba Dakota Cabinets 
and/or Wausau Business Ins. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2006 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE 
CHAPTER 2. WORKERS'COMPENSATION ACT 
PART 4. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (2006) 
§ 34A-2-413. Permanent total disability - Amount of payments ~ Rehabilitation 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease, the 
employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total 
disability. 
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to do 
basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee 
from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the 
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability 
claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant: 
(i) may be presented to the commission; 
(ii) is not binding; and 
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 
66- 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $ 45 per week, plus $ 5 for a dependent spouse, 
plus $ 5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but 
not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% 
of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of 
the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability 
compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial 
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining 
permanent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of 
the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial 
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by 
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer, 
its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the 
employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of 
compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by 
the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same 
period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to 
Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge: 
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return 
the employee to gainful employment; or 
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to: 
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and 
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection 
(6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a), the administrative law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's 
subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in Subsection (6)(b) is 
considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212. 
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under 
Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer or 
its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job placement 
services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's 
subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The employer's or 
insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the administrative law judge 
on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability. 
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative 
law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as 
determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled employee 
reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided that employment 
may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the reasonable, 
medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided under 
Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $ 500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent total 
disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $ 500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally 
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained in 
Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically appropriate 
part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake work 
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in 
Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but the employee 
has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has 
some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless 
the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an 
employee if the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative 
law judge states specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both 
eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated 
according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim, 
except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment 
responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final, unless good 
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee 
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert witness 
fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time 
of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability 
finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability benefits 
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably raises 
the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation benefits, an insurer or 
self-insured employer may petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be 
accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no 
longer permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division of 
Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the sole 
basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's 
participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination 
or hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees 
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the 
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $ 1,000. 
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total disability 
compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-
insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability 
compensation benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 116, § 4; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; 1991, ch. 136, § 12; 
1992, ch. 53, § 2; 1994, ch. 266, § 2; 1995, ch. 177, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 156; renumbered by 
L. 1997, ch. 375, § 121; 2005, ch. 261, § 1; 2006, ch. 295, § 5. 
NOTES: 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 1988, ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last amended by 
Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating to permanent total disability, effective July 1, 1988, and enacts the present section. 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, substituted "Before commencing the 
procedure required by Subsection (6)(a)" for "Prior to the finding becoming final" in Subsection (6)(b); added 
Subsection (6)(c); and made related and stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 2006 amendment, effective May 1, 2006, substituted "must prove" for "has the burden of proof to show" in the 
introductory clause in Subsection (l)(b) and rewrote the introduction to Subsection (l)(c), which read: "To find an 
employee permanently disabled, the commission shall conclude that." 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. -Laws 2006, ch. 295, which amended this section, provides in § 8 that the amendments 
are to be "interpreted as merely clarifying an existing principle that the employee bears the burden of proving that the 
employee is permanently totally disabled based on those factors listed as matters on which the commission is to 
make a conclusion in Subsection 34A-2-413 (l)(c), as enacted before the amendments of this bill." 
